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Abstract
Despite significant developments in proof theory, surprisingly little attention has been devoted to
the concept of proof verifiers. In particular, the mathematical community may be interested in
studying different types of proof verifiers (people, programs, oracles, communities,
superintelligences) as mathematical objects. Such an effort could reveal their properties, their
powers and limitations (particularly in human mathematicians), minimum and maximum
complexity, as well as self-verification and self-reference issues. We propose an initial
classification system for verifiers and provide some rudimentary analysis of solved and open
problems in this important domain. Our main contribution is a formal introduction of the notion
of unverifiability, for which the paper could serve as a general citation in domains of theorem
proving, as well as software and AI verification.
Keywords: verifier theory, proof theory, observer, verified verifier, verifiability
1. On observers and verifiers
The concept of an ‘observer’ shows up in contexts as diverse
as physics (particularly quantum and relativity), biophysics,
neuroscience, cognitive science, artificial intelligence (AI),
philosophy of consciousness, and cosmology [1], but what is
an equivalent idea in mathematics? We believe it is the notion
of the proof verifier. Consequently, the majority of open
questions recently raised [1] by the Foundational Questions
Institute related to the physics of the observer could be asked
about proof verifiers. In particular, the mathematical com-
munity may be interested in studying different types of proof
verifiers (people, programs, oracles, communities, super-
intelligences, etc) as mathematical objects, ways they can be
formalized, their power and limitations (particularly in human
mathematicians), minimum and maximum complexity, as
well as self-verification and self-reference in verifiers.
Proof theory has been developed to study proofs as for-
mal mathematical objects consisting of axioms from which,
by rules of inference, one can arrive at theorems [2]. How-
ever, the indispensable concept of the verifier has been con-
spicuously absent from the discussion, particularly with
regards to its formalization and practical manifestation. A
verifier in the context of mathematics is an agent capable of
checking a given proof, step-by-step, starting from axioms to
make sure that all intermediate deductions are indeed war-
ranted, that the final conclusion follows, and consequently,
that the claimed theorem is indeed true. In this work we
present an overview of different types of verifiers currently
relied on by the mathematical community, as well as a few
novel types of verifiers which we suggest be added to the
repertoire of mathematicians at least as theoretical tools of
verifier theory. Our general analysis should be equally
applicable to different types of proofs (induction, contra-
diction, exhaustion, enumeration, refinement, non-
constructive, probabilistic, holographic, experiment, picture,
etc) and to computer software.
2. Historical perspective
The field of mathematics progresses by proving theorems,
which in turn serve as building blocks for future proofs of yet
more interesting and useful theorems. To avoid introduction
of costly errors in the form of incorrect theorems, proofs
typically undergo an examination process, usually as a part of
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a peer-review. Traditionally, human mathematicians have
been employed as proof verifiers; however, history is full of
examples of undetected errors and important omissions even
in the most widely examined proofs [3–7]. It has been esti-
mated that at least a third of all mathematical publications
contain errors [8]. To avoid errors and make the job of human
verifiers as easy as possible ‘a single step in a deduction has
been required K [t]o be simple enough, broadly speaking, to
be apprehended as correct by a human being in a single
intellectual act. No doubt this custom originated in the desire
that each single step of a deduction should be indubitable,
even though the deduction as a whole may consist of a long
chain of such steps’ [9].
Despite such stringent requirements, it has long been
realized that a single human verifier is not reliable enough to
ascertain validity of a proof with a sufficient degree of
reliability. In fact, it is known that humans are subject to
hundreds of well-known ‘bugs’1, and probably many more
unknown ones. To reduce the number of potential mistakes
and to increase our confidence in the validity of a proof, a
number of independent human mathematicians should
examine an important mathematical claim. As Calude puts it,
‘A theorem is a statement which could be checked indivi-
dually by a mathematician and confirmed also individually by
at least two or three other mathematicians, each of them
working independently. But already we can observe the
weakness of the criterion: how many mathematicians are to
check individually and independently the status of [a con-
jecture] to give it a status of a theorem?’ [4].
Clearly, the greater the number of independent verifiers,
the higher is our confidence in the validity of a theorem. We
can say that ‘a theorem is validated if it has been accepted by
a general agreement of the mathematical community’ [4].
Krantz agrees and says: ‘it is the mathematics profession,
taken as a whole, that decides what is correct and valid, and
also what is useful and is interesting and has value’ [10].
Wittgenstein expresses similar views, as quoted in [11]: ‘who
validates the ‘mathematical knowledge’? K the acceptability
ultimately comes from the collective opinion of the social
group of people practising mathematics.’ So, for many prac-
titioners of mathematics, proof verification is a social and
democratic process in which ‘[a]fter enough internalization,
enough transformation, enough generalization, enough use,
and enough connection, the mathematical community even-
tually decides that the central concepts in the original theo-
rem, now perhaps greatly changed, have an ultimate stability.
If the various proofs feel right and the results are examined
from enough angles, then the truth of the theorem is even-
tually considered to be established’ [12].
While the mathematical community as a whole con-
stitutes a powerful proof verifier, a desire for ever greater
accuracy has led researchers to develop mechanized ver-
ification systems capable of handling formal proofs of great
length. The prototype for such verifiers has its roots in formal
systems [13] proposed by David Hilbert and which ‘contain
an algorithm that mechanically checks the validity of all
proofs that can be formulated in the system. The formal
system consists of an alphabet of symbols in which all
statements can be written; a grammar that specifies how the
symbols are to be combined; a set of axioms, or principles
accepted without proof; and rules of inference for deriving
theorems from the axioms’ [14]. However, there is a tradeoff
when one switches from using human verifiers to utilizing
automated ones, namely: ‘People are usually not very good in
checking formal correctness of proofs, but they are quite good
at detecting potential weaknesses or flaws in proofs’ [15].
‘Artificial’ mathematicians are far less ingenious and subtle
than human mathematicians, but they surpass their human
counterparts by being infinitely more patient and diligent’ [4].
In other words, while automated verifiers are excellent at
spotting incorrect deductions, they are much worse than
humans at seeing the ‘big picture’ outlined in the proof.
Additionally, to maintain a consistent standard of ver-
ification for all accepted theorems, a significant effort would
need to be applied to reexamine already-accepted proofs. ‘to
do so would certainly entail going back and rewriting from
scratch all old mathematical papers whose results we depend
on. It is also quite hard to come up with good technical
choices for formal definitions that will be valid in the variety
of ways that mathematicians want to use them and that will
anticipate future extensions of mathematics. K [M]uch of our
time would be spent with international standards commissions
to establish uniform definitions and resolve huge con-
troversies’ [15].
Such criticism of automated verifiers is not new and has
been expressed in the past, particularly from a human centric
point of view: ‘No matter how precise the rules (logical and
physical) are, we need human consciousness to apply the
rules and to understand them and their consequences.
Mathematics is a human activity’ [4]. Additionally, ‘[m]
echanical proof-checkers have indeed been developed, though
their use is currently limited by the need or the proof to be
written in precisely the right logical formalism’ [16].
Despite such criticism, there is also a lot of hope in terms
of what automated verification can offer mathematics. ‘[M]
athematical knowledge is far too vast to be understood by one
person, moreover, it has been estimated that the total amount
of published mathematics doubles every ten to fifteen yearsK
Perhaps computers can also help us to navigate, abstract and,
hence, understand K proofs. Realizing this dream of:
computer access to a world repository of mathematical
knowledge; visualizing and understanding this knowledge;
reusing and combining it to discover new knowledge’ [17].
3. Classification of verifiers
A certain connection exists between the concept of observer
in physics and a verifier in mathematics/science. Both must
be instantiated in the physical world as either hardware or
software to perform its function, but other than that, we
currently have a very limited understanding of types and
properties associated with such agents. As the first step, we
propose a simple classification system for verifiers, sorting1 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_cognitive_biases.
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them with respect to domain of application, type of imple-
mentation, and general properties. With respect to their
domain, we see verifiers as necessary for checking mathe-
matical proofs, scientific theories, software correctness,
intelligent behavior safety, and consistency and properties of
algorithms. Some examples:
• Software verifier—evaluates correctness of a program.
Via the Curry–Harvard correspondence [18], proof
verification and program verification are equivalent and
software verification is a special case of theorem
verification restricted to computational logic [19]. A
compiler or interpreter can be seen as a program syntax
verifier among other things.
• AI-verifier—is a particular type of software verifier
capable of verifying the behavior of intelligent systems
in novel environments unknown at the time of design
[20, 21]. Yampolskiy presents verification of self-
improving software [22, 23] as a particular challenge to
the AI community: ‘Ideally every generation of self-
improving system should be able to produce a verifiable
proof of its safety for external examination’ [24].
Consequently, research linking functional specification
to physical states is of great interest. ‘This type of theory
would allow use of formal tools to anticipate and control
behaviors of systems that approximate rational agents,
alternate designs such as satisficing agents, and systems
that cannot be easily described in the standard agent
formalism (powerful prediction systems, theorem-pro-
vers, limited-purpose science or engineering systems,
etc). It may also be that such a theory could allow
rigorously demonstrating that systems are constrained
from taking certain kinds of actions or performing certain
kinds of reasoning’ [20].
• Scientific theory verifier—examines the output of comp-
uter simulations of scientific theories. A scientific theory
cannot be considered fully accepted until it can be
expressed as an algorithm and simulated on a computer. It
should produce observations consistent with measure-
ments obtained in the real world, perhaps adjusting for the
relativity of time scale between simulation and the real
world. In other words, an unsimulatable hypothesis
should be considered significantly weaker than a
simulatable one. It is possible that the theory cannot be
simulated due to limits in our current computational
capacity, hardware design, or capability of programmers
and that it will become simulatable in the future, but until
such time, it should have a tentative status. A scientific
theory verifier could be seen as a formalized equivalent of
a peer-reviewer in science.
• NP solution verifier—is an algorithm which can quickly
(in polynomial time) check a certificate (also called
witness) representing a solution, which can then be used
to determine if a computation produces a ‘yes’ or ‘no’
answer. In fact, one of the requirements of NP-
completeness states that a problem is in that class if
there exists a verifier for the problem. An NP-
completeness verifier would check a reduction of a novel
problem to an already known problem in the NP class to
determine if it is of equal or lesser complexity.
Analogously, we can postulate an AI-completeness
verifier capable of checking if a problem is reducible to
an instance of the turing test [25–27].
With respect to type, verifiers could be people (or
groups of people), software, hypothetical agents such as
oracles, or artificial (super)intelligent entities. For
example:
• Human mathematician—historically the default verifier
for most mathematical proofs. Individual mathematicians
have been recruited to examine mathematical reasoning
since the inception of the field. Recent developments in
computer-generated proofs appear to be beyond the
capacity of human verifiers due to the size of such proofs.
• Mathematical community—a collective of mathemati-
cians taken as a whole used to examine and evaluate
claimed proofs, while at the same time removing any
outlier opinions of individual mathematicians. It is well
known that the wisdom of crowds can outperform
individual experts [28, 29].
• Mechanical verifier (automated proof checker)—auto-
mated software and hardware verifiers such as computer
programs have been developed to assist in verification of
formal proofs [30]. ‘The proof checker verifies that each
inference step in the proof is a valid instance of one of the
axioms and inference rules specified as part of the safety
policy’ [31]. They are believed to be more accurate than
human mathematicians and are capable of verifying much
longer proofs, which may not be surveyable [32–35] or
too complex (not comprehensible [36]) for human
mathematicians.
• Hybrid verifier—a combination of other types of verifiers,
most typically a human mathematician assisted by a
mechanical verifier.
• Oracle verifier—a verifier with access to an oracle turing
machine. Particular types would include a halting verifier
(a hypothetical verifier not subject to the halting
problem), a Gödel verifier (not subject to incompleteness
limits), and an undecidable proof verifier. All such
verification would be done in constant time.
• (Super)intelligent verifier—a verifier capable of checking
all decidable proofs, particularly those constructed by
superintelligent AI.
Some verifiers also have non-trivial mathematical
properties, which include: ability to self-verify, probabil-
istic proof checking, relative correctness, designated
nature, meta-verification capacity, honest or dishonest
behavior, and axiomatic acceptance. For example:
• Axiomatically correct verifier—a type of authority based
verifier, which decides the truth of a theorem without a
need to disclose its process. This is a verifier whose
correctness is accepted without justification, much like an
axiom is accepted by the math community.
• Designated verifier—for some proofs of knowledge it is
important that only the verifier nominated by the
3
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confirmer can get any confirmation of the correctness of
the proof [37].
• Honest (trusted) verifier—‘does not try to extract any
secret from the prover by deviating from the proof
protocol. K untrusted-verifier does not need to assume
that the verifier is honest’ [38].
• Probabilistic verifier—a verifier, which by examining an
ever-greater number of parts of a proof, arrives at a
probabilistic measure of the correctness of the theorem.
Such verifiers are a part of zero knowledge based
protocols.
• Relative verifier—a verifier with respect to which a
particular theorem has been shown to be correct, which
does not guarantee that it would be confirmed by other
verifiers.
• Gradual verifier—a verifier which determines a percent-
age of statements that are already guaranteed to be safe
[39], permitting a gradual verification process to take
place.
• Meta-verifier—a hypothetical verifier capable of checking
correctness of other verifiers.
• Self-verifier—an agent which is capable of verifying its
own accuracy [40]. A frequently suggested approach to
avoid an infinite regress of verifiers, a self-verifying
verifier could contain an error causing it to erroneously
claim its own correctness [41] and is also subject to
limitations imposed by Gödel’s Incompleteness theorem
[42] and other similar self-referential constraints [21].
4. Unverifiability
Unverifiability, an idea frequently discussed in philosophy
[43–45], has been implicitly present in mathematics since the
early days of the field. In this section, we survey literature that
deals with the limits of proof verifiability caused by infinite
regress of verifiers, and provides analysis of the concept of
unverifiability. We believe that such explicit discussion will
be useful to researchers interested in being able to cite this
important idea, which so far has been relegated to the status of
mathematical folklore [46] and only alluded to in the litera-
ture, despite being a more general result than incomplete-
ness [42, 47].
Unverifiability is a fundamental limitation on verification
of mathematical proofs, computer software, behavior of
intelligent agents, and all formal systems. It is an ultimate
limit to our ability to know certain information and is similar
to other major ‘impossibilities’ to acquiring knowledge in our
universe such as: uncertainty [48], randomness [49, 50],
incompleteness [42, 47], undecidability [51], undefinability
[52], unprovability [53], incompressibility [14], noncomput-
ability [54], and relativity [55]. Many paths can lead us to
arrive at the concept of unverifiability, but in this paper we
concentrate specifically on the infinite regress of verifiers.
For example, Calude et al state: ‘what if the ‘agent’
human or computer checking a proof for correctness makes a
mistake (agents are fallible)? Obviously, another agent has to
check that the agent doing the checking did not make any
mistakes. Some other agent will need to check that agent and
so on. Eventually one runs out of agents who could check the
proof and, in principle, they could all have made a mistake!’
[56]. Later, Calude and Muller emphasize: ‘one cannot prove
the correctness of the formal prover itself’ [57]. Similarly,
MacKenzie observes: ‘Indeed, if one was to apply the formal,
mechanical notion of proof entirely stringently, might not the
software of the automated theorem prover itself have to be
verified formally? K The formal, mechanized notion of proof
thus prompted a modern day version of Juvenal’s ancient
question, quis custodiet ipsos custodes, who will guard the
guards themselves?’ [58]. Others have expressed similar
sentiments [11].
Our trust in a formal proof is only as strong as our trust in
the verifier used to check the proof; as the verifier itself needs
to be verified, and so on ad infinitum, we are never given a
100% guarantee of correctness, only asymptotically increas-
ing probability of correctness. Worse yet, at the end of the
chain of verifiers there is typically a single human, whose
internal mechanism is simply not verifiable with our current
technology and possibly not verifiable in principle. Addi-
tionally, problems other than infinite regress of verifiers may
significantly reduce our ability to verify proofs. Such obsta-
cles include: splicing and skipping [59], hidden lemmas [60],
exponential size proofs [61] (with recent publication of a 200
terabyte computer proof [62] being only a current record
which is unlikely to stand for long), impenetrable proofs [63],
hardware failures [64, 65], Rice’s theorem [66], and Gödel’s
Incompleteness theorem [42].
After the advent of probabilistic proofs by Rabin [67],
‘[s]ome have argued that there is no essential difference
between such probabilistic proofs and the deterministic proofs
of standard mathematical practice. Both are convincing
arguments. Both are to be believed with a certain probability
of error. In fact, many deterministic proofs, it is claimed, have
a higher probability of error’ [68]. ‘K the authenticity of a
mathematical proof is not absolute, but only probabilistic. K
Proofs cannot be too long, else their probabilities go down
and they baffle the checking process. To put it in another way:
all really deep theorems are false (or at best unproved or
unprovable). All true theorems are trivial’ [3]. ‘A derivation
of a theorem or a verification of a proof has only probabilistic
validity. It makes no difference whether the instrument of
derivation or verification is man or a machine. The prob-
abilities may vary, but are roughly of the same order of
magnitude’ [3]. All proofs have a certain level of ‘proofness’
[69], which can be made arbitrarily deep via expending
necessary verification resources, but ‘in no domain of
mathematics is the notion of provability a perfect substitute
for the notion of truth [70].’ To conclude, we reiterate
Knuth’s famous warning: ‘Beware of bugs in the above code:
I have only proved it correct, not tried it.’
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5. Unverifiability of software
Unverifiability has important consequences not just for
mathematicians and philosophers of knowledge; more
recently it has become an important issue in software and
hardware verification, which can be seen as special cases of
proof verification [18, 19]. Just like a large portion of pub-
lished mathematical proofs, software is known to contain
massive amounts of bugs [71], perhaps as many as fifty per
thousand lines of code2, but maybe as few as 2.3 [72].
Similarly, just like with mathematical proofs, the issue of
infinite regress of verifiers is making software only prob-
abilistically verifiable. For example, Fetzer writes: ‘There are
no special difficulties so long as [higher-level machines’]
intended interpretations are abstract machines. When their
intended interpretations are target machines, then we
encounter the problem of determining the reliability of the
verifying programs themselves (‘How do we verify the veri-
fiers?’), which invites a regress of relative verifications’ [73].
This notion of unverifiability of software has been a part
of the field since its early days. Smith writes: ‘For funda-
mental reasons—reasons that anyone can understand—there
are inherent limitations to what can be proven about com-
puters and computer programs. K Just because a program is
‘proven correct’ K, you cannot be sure that it will do what
you intend’ [74]. Rodd agrees and says: ‘Indeed, although it is
now almost trite to say it, since the comprehensive testing of
software is impossible, only very vague estimates of any
program’s reliability seem ever to be possible’ [75]. Cur-
rently, most software is released without any attempt to for-
mally verify it in the first place.
5.1. Unverifiability of AI
One particular type of software, known as AI (and even more
so superintelligence), differs from other programs by its
ability to learn new behaviors, adjust its performance, and act
semi-autonomously in novel situations. Given the potential
impact from intelligent software, it is not surprising that the
ability to verify future intelligent behavior is one of the grand
challenges of modern AI research [24, 76–78].
It has been observed that science frequently discovers so
called ‘conjugate (complementary) pairs’, ‘a couple of
requirements, each of them being satisfied only at the expense
of the other K. It is known as the Principle of Com-
plementarity in physics. Famous prototypes of conjugate pairs
are (position, momentum) discovered by Heisenberg in
quantum mechanics and (consistency, completeness) dis-
covered by Gödel in logic. But similar warnings come from
other directions. According to Einstein K, ‘in so far as the
propositions of mathematics are certain, they do not refer to
reality, and in so far as they refer to reality, they are not
certain’, hence (certainty, reality) is a conjugate pair’ [56].
Similarly, in proofs we are ‘[t]aking rigour as something that
can be acquired only at the expense of meaning and
conversely, taking meaning as something that can be obtained
only at the expense of rigour’ [56]. With respect to intelligent
agents, we can propose an additional conjugate pair—(cap-
ability, control). The more generally intelligent and capable
an entity is, the less likely it is to be predictable, controllable,
or verifiable.
It is becoming obvious that just as we can only have
probabilistic confidence in correctness of mathematical proofs
and software implementations, our ability to verify intelligent
agents is at best limited. As Klein puts it: ‘if you really want
to build a system that can have truly unexpected behavior,
then by definition you cannot verify that it is safe, because
you just don’t know what it will do’3. Muehlhauser writes:
‘The same reasoning applies to [artificial general intelligence]
AGI ‘friendliness.’ Even if we discover (apparent) solutions
to known open problems in Friendly AI research, this does
not mean that we can ever build an AGI that is ‘provably
friendly’ in the strongest sense, because K we can never be
100% certain that there are no errors in our formal reasoning.
K Thus, the approaches sometimes called ‘provable secur-
ity,’ ‘provable safety,’ and ‘provable friendliness’ should not
be misunderstood as offering 100% guarantees of security,
safety, and friendliness.’4 Jilk, writing on limits to verification
and validation in AI, points out that ‘language of certainty’ is
unwarranted in reference to agentic behavior [79]. He also
states: ‘there cannot be a general automated procedure for
verifying that an agent absolutely conforms to any determi-
nate set of rules of action.’
Seshia et al, describing some of the challenges of creat-
ing verified AI, note: ‘It may be impossible even to precisely
define the interface between the system and environment (i.e.,
to identify the variables/features of the environment that must
be modeled), let alone to model all possible behaviors of the
environment. Even if the interface is known, non-determi-
nistic or over-approximate modeling is likely to produce too
many spurious bug reports, rendering the verification process
useless in practice. K [T]he complexity and heterogeneity of
AI-based systems means that, in general, many decision
problems underlying formal verification are likely to be
undecidable. K To overcome this obstacle posed by com-
putational complexity, one must K settle for incomplete or
unsound formal verification methods’ [78].
These results are not surprising. AI cannot be verified
because AI itself can serve as a verifier which we already
showed cannot be verified because of infinite regress problem
and general unverifiability. By spending increasing compu-
tational resources, the best we can hope for is an increased
statistical probability that our mathematical proofs, and soft-
ware/AI are error free, but we should never forget that a
100% accurate verification is not possible, even in theory, and
act accordingly. AI, and even more so artificial super-
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6. Implications for physics and science in general
From Ancient Greece to modern times the idea that a fun-
damental relationship exists between mathematics and phy-
sics has persisted, with multiple claims that our universe is
‘written’ in the language of mathematics [86–89]. Most
famously, in 1960, Wigner published his seminal paper
wondering about reasons for ‘the unreasonable effectiveness
of mathematics in natural sciences’ [90]. Tegmark, in his
mathematical universe hypothesis (MUH), suggested that the
answer is that ‘our external physical reality is a mathematical
structure’ [91–93]. Since the publication of the MUH a sig-
nificant amount of evidence has been published linking fun-
damental theory of nature (Quantum Physics) with different
mathematical structures, including many recent discoveries
[94–96].
In this paper, we argue that all mathematical proofs are
inherently probabilistic and by extension so is all of mathe-
matics. Therefore, unverifiability—one of the ultimate limits
to computational techniques can be considered as another
piece of evidence in favor of the MUH. In Copenhagen
interpretation of quantum mechanics wavefunction descrip-
tion is probabilistic. The Born rule [97], a fundamental
component of Copenhagen interpretation, provides a link
between mathematics and experimental observations. More
specifically, the Born rule predicts the probability of obser-
ving a particle at a given location as proportionate to the
square of the magnitude of the wavefunction at that coordi-
nate. Observations in quantum physics, just like in mathe-
matics, are probabilistic [98] and by extension so is all of
physics. Using a different interpretation of quantum physics,
for example many-worlds interpretation [99] which is more
consistent with the MUH, leads to similar conclusions
regarding verifiability [100].
Interestingly, Wigner himself in the same paper hints at
mathematical unverifiability: ‘Similarly, it is possible that the
theories, which we consider to be ‘proved’ by a number of
numerical agreements which appears to be large enough for
us, are false because they are in conflict with a possible more
encompassing theory which is beyond our means of dis-
covery’ [90]. More generally, cosmology and unverifiability
are intimately linked meaning ‘we are unable to obtain a
model of the Universe without some specifically cosmologi-
cal assumptions which are completely unverifiable’ [101]. In
case of theories such as many-worlds, the multiverse by
definition is unobservable by the same observer or multiple
observers able to communicate and so is experimentally
unverifiable.
We have constructed our argument for unverifiability
based on an infinite regress of verifiers after reasoning that
verifiers are a mathematical equivalent of observers in phy-
sics. Infinite regress of observers is a fundamental part of
physics, as exemplified by Wigner’s friend [102] thought
experiment, as well as a fundamental matter of reproducibility
of scientific experiments [103], in which scientists are the
observers. A particular experiment could be repeated many
times always increasing our confidence in the results, but just
like with proof verification, never giving us a 100% certainty
in its results. With the recent reproducibility crisis [104, 105]
in multiple fields of science [106–109] our results are very
timely and should allow for a better understanding of limits to
verifiability and resources required to get desired levels of
confidence in the results.
7. Conclusions and future work
Our preliminary work suggests that the ‘verifier’ be inves-
tigated as a new mathematical object of interest for future
study and opens the door for an improved understanding of
the topic. For example, an artificially intelligent verifier
could be used to re-check all previously published mathe-
matical proofs, greatly increasing correctness of all proofs.
Problems such as infinite regress of verifiers may be
unsolvable, but methods such as probabilistic verification
should be capable of giving us as much assurance as we are
willing to pay for. Any progress in the proposed ‘verifier
theory’ will have additional benefits beyond its contribution
to mathematics by making it possible to design safer
advanced AI, a topic that is predicted to become one of the
greatest problems in science in the upcoming decades
[110, 111]. A verifier is a hidden component of any proof;
we can improve our capacity to verify by explicitly
describing the required verification agent.
It would be valuable to learn what types of physical or
informational systems can act as verifiers and what their
essential properties are. We should explore how selection of
the type of the verifier influences mathematics as a field and
specifically what categories of theorems we can prove and
which we cannot prove with respect to different verifiers.
Are there still undiscovered types of mathematical verifiers?
Does a group of verifiers have greater power than the sum
of its component modules? How can verifiers perform best
while operating with limited computational resources?
What is the formal relationship between the set of all
verifiers and the set of all observers? Can a verifier be
hacked and can the attack be contained in the proof it is
examining? Can all these questions be reduced to a broader
question on the nature of different possible types of intel-
ligences [112]?
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